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Abstract
We prove that every multiplayer quitting game admits a sunspot
ε-equilibrium for every ε > 0, that is, an ε-equilibrium in an extended
game in which the players observe a public signal at every stage. We
also prove that if a certain matrix that is derived from the payoffs in
the game is a Q-matrix in the sense of linear complementarity prob-
lems, then the game admits a Nash ε-equilibrium for every ε > 0.
Keywords: Stochastic games, quitting games, stopping games, sunspot equi-
librium, linear complementarity problems, Q-matrices.
1 Introduction
Shapley (1953) introduced the model of stochastic games as a model of dy-
namic interactions in which players’ actions affect both the stage payoffs and
the evolution of the state variable. Shapley studied the two-player zero-sum
model, and proved that the discounted value always exists and that both
players have stationary optimal strategies. This result was extended to the
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existence of discounted equilibria in multiplayer stochastic games by Fink
(1964) and Takahashi (1964).
The equilibrium strategies are not robust, as they depend on the discount
factor. Mertens and Neyman (1981) proposed a solution concept that is ro-
bust to variation in the discount factor: given ε > 0, a strategy profile is a
uniform ε-equilibrium if it is a discounted ε-equilibrium for every discount
factor sufficiently close to 0. Mertens and Neyman (1981) proved that ev-
ery two-player zero-sum stochastic game admits a uniform ε-equilibrium, for
every ε > 0, and Vieille (2000a,2000b) extended this result to two-player non-
zero-sum games. Solan (1999) proved that a uniform ε-equilibrium exists in
three-player absorbing games, which are stochastic games with a single non-
absorbing states. It is still not known whether any multiplayer stochastic
game admits a uniform ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
In their study of uniform equilibrium in multiplayer stochasic games,
Solan and Vieille (2001) introduced a new class of absorbing games, called
quitting games, which is inspired by the game studied by Flesch, Thuijsman,
and Vrieze (1997). In a quitting game, each one of N players decides at
every stage whether to continue or to quit. As long as all players continue,
the game continues. Once at least one player quits, the game terminates,
and the terminal payoff depends on the set of players who decide to quit
at the terminal stage. Solan and Vieille (2001) proved that if each player
prefers to quit alone rather than to quit with other players, then a uniform
ε-equilibrium exists. This result was extended to a more general class of
quitting games by Simon (2012).
Aumann (1974, 1987) introduced the concept of correlated equilibrium in
strategic-form games. A correlated equilibrium in a strategic-form game is
an equilibrium in an extended game that includes a correlation device, which
sends to each player a private signal before the play starts. In dynamic games
several variations of correlated equilibrium come to mind (see Forges (1986)
and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). The most general concept is communica-
tion equilibrium, that corresponds to an equilibrium in an extended game in
which at every stage the device receives a private message from each player
and sends a private signal to each player, which may depend on past mes-
sages and signals of all players. A more restricted concept is extensive-form
correlated equilibrium, which corresponds to the situation in which the device
sends a private message to each player at the beginning of every stage, and
does not receive any message from the players. Yet a more restricted concept
is normal-form correlated equilibrium, which corresponds to the situation in
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which the device sends one private message to each player at the beginning
of the game. Cass and Shell (1984) proposed the concept of sunspot equilib-
rium, which is an equilibrium in a game extended by a correlation device that
publicly sends to the players at every stage a uniformly distributed random
variable in [0, 1] that is chosen independently of past signals and past play.
Solan and Vieille (2002) proved that every multiplayer stochastic game
admits an extensive-form uniform correlated ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0,
and Solan and Vohra (2002) proved that every multiplayer absorbing game
admits a normal-form uniform correlated ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0. In
this paper we prove that every multiplayer quitting game admits a sunspot
uniform ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0. Solan and Vieille (2001) proved that
in quitting games, every undiscounted ε-equilibrium is also uniform, and their
argument carries over to correlated equilibria.
In this paper we prove that every multiplayer quitting game admits an
undiscounted sunspot ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0. By the above mentioned
result of Solan and Vieille (2001), this implies that every multiplayer quitting
game admits a sunspot uniform ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
Our proof uses heavily the notion of Q-matrices from linear complemen-
tarity problems (see, e.g., Murty, 1988). Given an n × n matrix R and a
vector q ∈ Rn, the linear complementarity problem LCP(R, q) is the problem
of finding two vectors w, z ∈ Rn≥0 := {x ∈ Rn : xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n]} such that
(a) w = Rz + q and (b) wi = 0 or zi = 0 for every i ∈ [n]. A matrix R
is called a Q-matrix if a solution to the problem LCP(R, q) exists for every
q ∈ Rn.
Denote by ri ∈ Rn the terminal payoff in the quitting game if player i
quits alone. By adding a constant to the payoffs, we can assume without loss
of generality that rii = 0; that is, each player who quits alone receives 0. Call
a player normal if there is a player j 6= i such that rji ≤ 0: if player i knows
that player j is going to quit alone, he will prefer to quit before him.1 Let I∗
be the set of all normal players, and let r̂i ∈ RI∗ be the vector ri restricted
to the coordinates that correspond to normal players. Rename the players
so that the normal players are players number 1, 2, · · · , |I∗|, and let R̂ be the
|I∗| × |I∗| matrix whose i’th column coincides with r̂i.
We show that if the matrix R̂ is not a Q-matrix, then the quitting game
admits a uniform ε-equilibrium for every ε > 0, and if the matrix R̂ is a
Q-matrix, then for every ε > 0 the quitting game admits a uniform sunspot
1Our notion of normal players will be weaker than the one provided here; see Section 2.3.
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ε-equilibrium, in which at every stage at most one player quits with positive
probability.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we prove that every quitting game
admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium. Second, we identify a general con-
dition that ensures that a uniform ε-equilibrium exists in quitting games.
Third, we relate the question of existence of uniform equilibrium in stochas-
tic games to linear complementarity problems. In particular, our work limits
the class of quitting games for which the existence of a uniform ε-equilibrium
is not known. We hope that our result will pave the road to proving the ex-
istence of a sunspot ε-equilibrium in every stochastic game and the existence
of a uniform ε-equilibrium in quitting games.
The paper is organized as follows. The model and the main results are
described in Section 2. The proof of the main result appears in Section 3.
In Section 4 we discuss the characterization of sunspot equilibrium payoffs
when the matrix R̂ is a M -matrix, namely, a Q-matrix for which in each row
and each column there is exactly one positive entry. Discussion and open
problems, including a discussion on the extension of our result to stopping
games, appear in Section 5.
2 The Model and the Main Results
2.1 The Model
A quitting game Γ((rS)S⊆I) is given by
• A finite set of players I = [N ] := {1, 2, · · · , N}.
• For every subset S of I, a vector rS ∈ [−1, 1]N .
Note that we assume w.l.o.g. that payoffs are bounded by 1.
The game evolves as follows. At every stage t ∈ N each player decides
whether to continue or quit. Denote by t∗ the first stage in which at least
one player quits, and by S∗ the set of players who quit at stage t∗. If no
player ever quits, then t∗ =∞ and S∗ = ∅. The payoff to the players is rS∗ .
For convenience, whenever S = {i} contains one element we write ri
instead of r{i}. We will maintain the following assumption, which states that
if a player quits alone, his payoff is 0. This assumption is made without
loss of generality, since adding a constant to the payoffs of a player does not
change his strategic considerations.
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Assumption 2.1 For every i ∈ I we have rii = 0.
A quitting game is a strategic-form game in which the set of pure strate-
gies of each player is N∪ {∞}, where the interpretation of the pure strategy
∞ is that the player never quits. A (behavior) strategy of player i is a se-
quence xi = (x
t
i)t∈N of numbers in [0, 1], with the interpretation that x
t
i is
the conditional probability that player i quits at stage t, provided no player
quit before that stage. Denote by Xi the set of all strategies of player i, by
X−i := ×j∈I\{i}Xi the set of all strategy profiles of the other players, and by
X := ×i∈IXi the set of strategy profiles.
Every strategy profile x = (xi)i∈I ∈ X induces a probability distribution
Px over the set of plays. We denote by Ex[·] the corresponding expectation
operator. Denote by γ(x) := Ex[r
S∗ ] the expected payoff under strategy
profile x. A strategy profile x is an ε-equilibrium if for every i ∈ I and every
strategy x′i ∈ Xi of player i we have
γi(x) ≥ γi(x′i, x−i)− ε.
Using the insights of Flesch, Thuijsman, and Vrieze (1997), Solan (1999)
proved that every three-player absorbing game, hence every three-player quit-
ting game, admits an ε-equilibrium for every ε > 0. Solan and Vieille (2001)
and Simon (2012) extended this result to multi-player quitting games that
satisfy various conditions.
A strategy xi = (x
t
i)t∈N ∈ Xi is stationary if xti = xt′i for every t, t′ ∈ N.
In this case we denote by xi the probability by which player i quits at every
stage, and we view a stationary strategy profile x = (xi)i∈I as a vector in
[0, 1]N . We denote by Ci (resp. Qi) the stationary strategy of player i in
which he always continues (resp. always quits).
The following observation asserts that if there is a normal player i such
that ri ∈ RN≥0, then a stationary ε-equilibrium exists.
Lemma 2.2 If there is a normal player i ∈ I∗ such that ri ∈ RN≥0, then a
stationary ε-equilibrium exists, for every ε > 0.
Proof. Since player i is normal, there is j ∈ I such that rji ≤ 0. The
reader can verify that the following stationary strategy profile x is a 4ε-
equilibrium:
xi = ε, xj = ε
2, xk = Ck ∀k ∈ I \ {i, j}.
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Solan (1999) proved that in every three-player quitting game there is an
ε-equilibrium of one of two simple forms: there is always a stationary ε-
equilibrium or an ε-equilibrium in which at every stage at most one player
quits with positive probability. Solan and Vieille (2002) provided a four-
player quitting games in which there is an ε-equilibrium, yet for ε > 0 suffi-
ciently small there is neither a stationary ε-equilibrium nor an ε-equilibrium
in which at every stage at most one player quits with positive probability. To
date it is not known whether four-player quitting games admit ε-equilibria
for every ε > 0.
2.2 Sunspot Equilibrium
We enrich the game by introducing a public correlation device. That is,
at the beginning of every stage t ∈ N the players observe a public signal
st ∈ [0, 1] that is drawn by the uniform distribution, independently of past
signals.
A strategy of player i in the game with public correlation device is a
sequence of measurable functions ξi = (ξ
t
i)t∈N, where ξ
t
i : [0, 1]
t → [0, 1]. The
interpretation of ξti is that if no player quits before stage t, then at stage t
player i quits with probability ξti(s
1, s2, · · · , st).
Every strategy profile ξ = (ξi)i∈I induces a probability distribution over
the set of plays in the game with public correlation device, with a correspond-
ing expectation operator that is denoted by Eξ[·]. Denote by γ(ξ) := Eξ[rS∗ ]
the expected payoff under strategy profile ξ.
Definition 2.3 A strategy profile ξ is a sunspot ε-equilibrium if it is an
ε-equilibrium in the game with public correlation device, that is, if for every
i ∈ I and every strategy ξ′i of player i we have
γi(ξ) ≥ γi(ξ′i, ξ−i)− ε.
The main result of this paper is the following.
Theorem 2.4 Every quitting game admits a sunspot ε-equilibrium, for every
ε > 0.
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2.3 Normal and Abnormal Players
Simon (2012) defined the concepts of normal and abnormal players in quitting
games. According to Simon (2012), player i is normal if there is a player
j 6= i such that rji ≤ rii, and he is abnormal otherwise. To prove our main
result we could use these notions. However, below we provide a condition
that ensures that the game admits a stationary ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0;
see Theorem 2.11. This condition can be proven using a weaker notion of
normality, hence we elect to use this weaker notion and define it in this
section.
Define inductively
I0 := I,
Il+1 := {i ∈ Il : there exists j ∈ Il such that rji ≤ 0}.
For each player i ∈ Il+1 there is a player j ∈ Il who gives, by quitting alone,
a nonpositive payoff to player i. Consequently,
i ∈ Il, j 6∈ Il ⇒ rij > 0. (1)
The sequence (Il)l∈N is a decreasing sequence of sets, hence I∗ := ∩l∈NIl
exists. Eq. (1) implies that
i ∈ I∗, j 6∈ I∗ ⇒ rij > 0. (2)
Definition 2.5 Every player in the set I∗ is called normal, and every player
in the complement of I∗ is called abnormal. The number of normal players
is denoted n := |I∗|.
A player is normal according to Simon’s (2012) definition if he belongs
to the set I1. Thus, our definition of normality is a recursive application of
Simon’s definition.
Below we will construct sunspot ε-equilibria in which at every stage at
most one player quits. Every player who quits alone receives 0, while by
Eq. (2) every abnormal player receives a positive payoff when a normal player
quits. It is therefore not a wonder that in those equilibria we can ignore
abnormal players: if we can construct an equilibrium in which at every stage
only one player quits, and this player is a normal player, then the payoff of
an abnormal player is positive, hence he will not quit alone.
7
The following result allows us to assume that the set of normal players
is nonempty. Since there cannot be a single normal player, we deduce from
this result that if an ε-equilibrium does not exist for every ε > 0, then there
are at least two normal players. In fact, Theorem 2.11 below implies that if
there are two normal players, then a stationary ε-equilibrium exists.
Lemma 2.6 If all players are abnormal then there is a stationary ε-equilibrium
for every ε > 0.
Proof. If I1 = ∅ then ri ∈ RN≥0 for every i ∈ I. If r∅ ∈ RN≥0, then the
stationary strategy profile in which all players continue is a 0-equilibrium. If
there is a player i ∈ I for which r∅i < 0, then the stationary strategy profile
in which all players except player i continue, and player i quits at every stage
with probability ε, is a 2ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
Suppose now that I1 6= ∅, let l ≥ 1 be the maximal index such that Il 6= ∅,
and let i ∈ Il be arbitrary. Since i ∈ Il ⊆ I1, there is some player j 6= i such
that rji ≤ 0. Since Il+1 = ∅, for every player k ∈ Il \ {i} we have rik > 0. By
Eq. (1), for every player k 6∈ Il we have rik > 0. It follows that ri ∈ Rn≥0, and
therefore by Lemma 2.2 a stationary ε-equilibrium exists for every ε > 0.
2.4 Linear Complementarity Problems and the Main
Result
Let r1, r2, · · · , rn be n vectors in Rn, and let q ∈ Rn. The linear complemen-
tarity problem LCP((ri)ni=1, q) is the following problem that consists of linear
equalities and inequalities:
Find w ∈ Rn≥0, and z = (z0, z1, · · · , zn) ∈ ∆({0, 1, · · · , n}),
such that w = z0q +
n∑
i=1
zir
i, (3)
zi = 0 or wi = 0, ∀i ∈ [n].
The last condition in the problem (3) is the complementarity condition.
We note that for q ∈ Rn≥0 there is always at least one solution to the
problem (3), namely, z = (1, 0, · · · , 0) and w = q.
Remark 2.7 Let R be an n × n matrix, and let q ∈ Rn. In the literature,
the linear complementarity problem LCP(R, q) is the following problem that
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consists of linear equalities and inequalities:
Find z, w ∈ Rn≥0,
such that w = q +Rz, (4)
zi = 0 or wi = 0, ∀i ∈ [n].
We call the problem (3) a linear complementarity problem since it is obtained
from problem (4) by multiplication by the positive real number z0, provided
z0 > 0. Lemma 2.10 below implies that in our application, when z0 = 0
a stationary ε-equilibrium exists, hence in the cases in which stationary ε-
equilibria do not exist the two problems (3) and (4) are equivalent.
Definition 2.8 An n× n matrix R is called a Q-matrix if for every q ∈ Rn
the linear complementarity problem LCP(R, q) has at least one solution.
The authors are not aware of any characterization of Q-matrices. The
following example illustrates the concept of Q-matrices.
Example 2.9 Let R be a 3× 3 matrix that has the following sign form:
R =
 0 + −− 0 +
+ − 0

Theorem 6.2.7 in Berman and Plemmons (1994) implies that the matrix R
is a Q-matrix if and only its determinant is positive.
Recall that the number of normal players is denoted by n. Order the
players so that the set of normal players is I∗ = [n]. For every normal
player i ∈ I∗ we denote by r̂i ∈ Rn the restriction of the vector ri to the
coordinates in I∗. Denote by R̂ the n×n matrix whose i’th column is r̂i. By
Assumption 2.1, all entries on the diagonal of R̂ are 0.
Denote by ~0 the vector all of whose coordinates are 0. The following
observation states that if the linear complementarity problem LCP(R̂,~0) has
a nontrivial solution, then the game possesses a stationary ε-equilibrium for
every ε > 0.
Lemma 2.10 If there is a solution (w, z) of the linear complementarity prob-
lem LCP(R̂,~0) that satisfies z0 < 1, then there is a stationary ε-equilibrium
for every ε > 0.
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We note that If the linear complementarity problem LCP(R̂, q) has a
nontrivial solution (w, z) with z0 = 0, then the problem LCP(R̂,~0) has a
nontrivial solution as well.
Proof. Let (w, z) be a solution of the linear complementarity problem
LCP(R̂,~0) that satisfies z0 < 1 and let J := {i ∈ I∗ : zi > 0}. Then wi = 0
for every i ∈ J and w = ∑i∈J ziri.
If J = {i} contains a single player, then necessarily ri = w ∈ RN≥0, and
by Lemma 2.2 there is a stationary ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0. Assume
then that |J | ≥ 2.
Fix ε > 0 sufficiently small and consider the following stationary strategy
profile x: each player i quits at every stage with probability εzi. Then∥∥∥γ(x)−∑i∈I∗ zi1−z0 ri∥∥∥∞ < 2ε, so that ∣∣∣γi(x)− wi1−z0 ∣∣∣ < 2ε for every i ∈ I∗,
and γi(x) > −2ε for every i 6∈ I∗.
Since each player i ∈ I∗ quits with probability εzi, it follows that no
player can profit much by quitting:
γi(Qi, x−i) ≤ 2ε ≤ γi(x) + 4ε.
If some player i ∈ I∗ with zi > 0 deviates by always continuing, then his
payoff γi(Ci, x−i) is close to
∑
j∈I∗\{i}
zj
1−z0−zi r
j
i . Note that since |J | ≥ 2
the denominator does not vanish. Since zi > 0 we have wi = 0, hence∑
j∈I∗\{i}
zj
1−z0−zi r
j
i = 0 ≤ γi(x) + 2ε, so the profit by this deviation is not
large either. The result follows.
Lemma 2.6 and Lemma 2.10 show that for every ε > 0 a stationary ε-
equilibrium exists as soon as I∗ = ∅, or I∗ 6= ∅ and the linear complementarity
problem LCP(R̂,~0) has a nontrivial solution. The following theorem, which is
proven in the next section, completes the proof of Theorem 2.4. In addition
to proving that in every quitting game a sunspot ε-equilibrium exists, it
links the property of R̂ being a Q-matrix to the structure of the sunspot
ε-equilibria in the quitting game.
Theorem 2.11 Suppose that I∗ 6= ∅ and the linear complementarity problem
LCP(R̂,~0) does not have a nontrivial solution.
1. If the matrix R̂ is not a Q-matrix, then the quitting game Γ((rS)S⊆I)
has a stationary ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
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2. If the matrix R̂ is a Q-matrix, then for every ε > 0 the quitting game
Γ((rS)S⊆I) has a sunspot ε-equilibrium in which at every stage at most
one player quits with positive probability.
2.5 An Example
To illustrate the solution concept and our approach, in this section we pro-
vide the construction of a sunspot ε-equilibrium that uses only unilateral
quittings in a specific game. We will provide two constructions; the first will
be used in Section 4 to characterize the set of sunspot equilibrium payoffs in
a certain class of quitting games. Unfortunately we could not generalize it
to all quitting games. The second construction will serve us in the proof of
the general case.
Consider a quitting game with four players, where the vectors (ri)4i=1 are
given by2
r1 = (0, 4,−1,−1), r2 = (4, 0,−1,−1), r3 = (−1,−1, 0, 4), r4 = (−1,−1, 4, 0).
The rest of the payoff function, namely, the vectors r∅ and (rS)|S|≥2, will not
affect the analysis hence is omitted. We note that all players are normal, and
that these payoffs are essentially the same payoffs that where used by Solan
and Vieille (2002) to construct a quitting game in which there is neither a
stationary ε-equilibrium nor an ε-equilibrium in which at every stage at most
one player quits with positive probability.
2.5.1 First Construction
Observe that
(1, 1, 0, 0) = 1
2
(2, 0, 0, 0) + 1
2
(0, 2, 0, 0) (5)
= 1
2
(
1
2
(4, 0,−1,−1) + 1
2
(0, 0, 1, 1)
)
+ 1
2
(
1
2
(0, 4,−1,−1) + 1
2
(0, 0, 1, 1))
)
,
and similarly
(0, 0, 1, 1) = 1
2
(0, 0, 2, 0) + 1
2
(0, 0, 0, 2) (6)
= 1
2
(
1
2
(−1,−1, 4, 0) + 1
2
(1, 1, 0, 0)
)
+ 1
2
(
1
2
(−1,−1, 0, 4) + 1
2
(1, 1, 0, 0))
)
.
Fix ε > 0 such that 1
ε
is an integer. The following construction, in which
the players implement the payoff vector (1, 1, 0, 0) as a sunspot equilibrium
payoff, suggests itself:
2In this example only we deviate from the assumption that payoffs are bounded by 1.
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• Nature chooses whether the players implement the vector (2, 0, 0, 0) (if
the current signal is smaller than 1
2
) or the vector (0, 2, 0, 0) (if the
current signal is at least 1
2
).
• If Nature chose to implement the vector (2, 0, 0, 0), in each one of the
next 1
ε
stages Player 2 quits with probability λ, where (1 − λ)1/ε = 1
2
.
That is, in each of these stages Player 2 quits with a small probability,
and during these stages the total probability that he quits is 1
2
.
• If Nature chose to implement the vector (0, 2, 0, 0), in each one of the
next 1
ε
stages Player 1 quits with probability λ, where (1− λ)1/ε = 1
2
.
• At the end of the 1
ε
stages, if no player quits, the players turn to
implement the vector (0, 0, 1, 1) in an analogous way.
We denote by ξ∗ the strategy profile that was just defined. Under ξ∗ the
game terminates with probability 1. Moreover, even if one of the players
deviates, the game terminates with probability 1. Eqs. (5) and (6) imply
that γ(ξ∗) = (1, 1, 0, 0), and, more generally, that when the players attempt
to implement a certain vector, say (2, 0, 0, 0), their expected payoff is that
vector.
We now argue that no player can profit much by deviating from ξ∗. To
this end we note that the expected continuation payoff of all players after
every history is nonnegative. In each stage in which a player is supposed
to quit with positive probability, his continuation payoff is 0, hence at such
stages the player is indifferent between continuing and quitting.
A player who is supposed to quit with a positive probability at a given
stage, does so with probability λ, which is small. Consequently, since payoffs
are bounded by 4 and by Assumption 2.1, if a player deviates and quits at
a stage in which he is supposed to continue his payoff is at most 4λ. Since
the continuation payoff of all players after every history is nonnegative, this
implies that no player who is supposed to continue at a given stage can profit
more than 4λ by quitting at that stage.
As we will see in Section 4, this construction can be generalized to the
case in which the matrix R̂ contains exactly one positive entry in each row
and each column.
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2.5.2 Second Construction
Fix ε ∈ (0, 1). We will use the following identities:3
(0, 0, 2, 0) = ε
6+ε
(0, 0, 0, 2) + 6
6+ε
(0, 0, 6+ε
3
,− ε
3
), (7)
and
(0, 0, 6+ε
3
,− ε
3
) = 1
6
(0, 4ε, 2− 3ε,−ε) + 1
6
(4ε, 0, 2− 3ε,−ε) + 4
6
(−ε,−ε, 2 + 2ε, 0)
= 1
6
(
(1− ε)(0, 0, 2, 0) + ε(0, 4,−1,−1)) (8)
+1
6
(
(1− ε)(0, 0, 2, 0) + ε(4, 0,−1,−1))
+4
6
(
(1− ε)(0, 0, 2, 0) + ε(−1,−1, 4, 0)).
These equalities suggest the following construction of a sunspot 5ε-equilibrium
ξ∗ with γ(ξ∗) = (0, 0, 2, 0).
• Nature chooses whether to implement the vector (0, 0, 0, 2) (with prob-
ability ε
6+ε
), the vector (0, 4ε, 2−3ε,−ε) (with probability 1
6+ε
), the vec-
tor (4ε, 0, 2− 3ε,−ε) (with probability 1
6+ε
), or the vector (−ε,−ε, 2 +
2ε, 0) (with probability 4
6+ε
).
• If Nature chose to implement the vector (0, 0, 0, 2), then the players
repeat the analogous construction with the appropriate amendments.
• If Nature chose to implement the vector (0, 4ε, 2−3ε,−ε), then Player 1
quits with probability ε and continues with probability 1− ε.
• If Nature chose to implement the vector (4ε, 0, 2−3ε,−ε), then Player 2
quits with probability ε and continues with probability 1− ε.
• If Nature chose to implement the vector (−ε,−ε, 2+2ε, 0), then Player 4
quits with probability ε and continues with probability 1− ε.
• If no player quit, then the players implement the payoff (0, 0, 2, 0) as
indicated above.
As in the first construction, under the strategy profile ξ∗ the game terminates
with probability 1, hence by Eqs. (7) and (8) the expected payoff under ξ∗
3The verification of the calculations in this construction can be simplified by observing
that the total sum of the coordinates of all vectors in the construction is 2.
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after every finite history is the payoff vector that the players implement
beginning at that stage.
We now argue that no player can profit more than 5ε by deviating from
ξ∗. Note that the play terminates with probability 1 even if a single player
deviates. Consequently, when a player is supposed to quit with positive
probability, he is indifferent between continuing and quitting. Moreover, if
some player, say player i, is supposed to continue after some finite history,
then his continuation payoff is at least −ε, while, since the player who quits
with positive probability does so with probability ε, by quitting player i will
obtain at most 4ε. Thus no player can profit more than 5ε by deviating from
ξ∗.
3 Proof of Theorem 2.11
In this section we prove Theorem 2.11. We start by describing the discounted
game, which will be used in the proof of the first claim of the theorem. This
claim will be proven in Section 3.2 and the second claim will be proven in
Section 3.3.
3.1 The Discounted Game
In this section we consider the discounted game, in which the vector r∅ repre-
sents the stage payoff until the game terminates. Formally, given a discount
factor λ ∈ [0, 1), the λ-discounted game Γλ((rS)S⊆I) is the strategic-form
game (I, (Xi)i∈I , γλ), where the set of players coincides with the set of play-
ers in the original quitting game Γ((rS)S⊆I), the set of strategies of each
player i ∈ I is Xi, his set of behavior strategies in the original quitting game,
and the payoff function is given by
γλ(x) := Ex
[
(1− λ)
∞∑
t=1
λt−1
(
1{t<t∗}r
∅ + 1{t≥t∗}r
S∗
)]
= Ex[(1− λt∗−1)r∅ + λt∗−1rS∗ ].
When x is a stationary strategy profile, we have
γλ(x) =
λ
∏
i∈I(1− xi)r∅ +
∑
∅6=S⊆I
(∏
i∈S xi
∏
i 6∈S(1− xi)rS
)
λ
∏
i∈I(1− xi) +
∑
∅6=S⊆I
(∏
i∈S xi
∏
i 6∈S(1− xi)
) . (9)
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A strategy profile x ∈ X is a λ-discounted equilibrium if for every player
i ∈ I and every strategy x′i ∈ Xi of player i we have γλi (x) ≥ γλi (x′i, x−i).
By Fink (1964) or Takahashi (1964) the λ-discounted game admits a λ-
discounted equilibrium in stationary strategies. By Bewley and Kohlberg
(1976) one can choose a semi-algebraic function λ 7→ xλ that assigns a sta-
tionary discounted equilibrium to each discount factor. In particular, we can
assume w.l.o.g. that the limit x0 := limλ→0 xλ exists. Moreover, we can as-
sume that either xλi = 0 for every λ sufficiently close to 0 or x
λ
i > 0 for every
λ sufficiently close to 0.
3.2 Stationary ε-Equilibria
In this section we prove the first statement of Theorem 2.11. Let x be
a stationary strategy profile. If
∑
i∈I xi = 0, then x = ~0, and the game
continue forever. If
∑
i∈I xi > 0 then at least one player quits at every period
with positive probability, and the game terminates a.s. It is well known
(see, e.g., Vrieze and Thuijsman (1989) or Solan (1999)) that if (xλ)λ>0 is a
sequence of stationary strategy profiles such that x0 := limλ→0 xλ exists and
if
∑
i∈I x
0
i > 0, then
lim
λ→0
γλ(xλ) = γ(x0) = γ̂(x0) = lim
λ→0
γ̂λ(xλ). (10)
Suppose now that the matrix R̂ is not a Q-matrix. Then there is a vector
q̂ ∈ Rn such that the linear complementarity problem LCP(R̂, q̂) does not
have any solution. In particular, q̂ 6∈ Rn≥0. Extend q̂ to a vector in RN by
setting all coordinates that are not4 in [n] to 1, and denote by q the resulting
vector.
Consider the auxiliary quitting game Γ((rS)∅6=S⊆I , q), where q is the pay-
off if no player ever quits, and the λ-discounted version of this game. To
distinguish the payoff in the original game from the payoff in the auxiliary
game, we denote the former by γ(x) and γλ(x), and the latter by γ̂(x) and
γ̂λ(x). For every discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1] let xλ be a stationary equilibrium
of the auxiliary quitting game and denote x0 := limλ→0 xλ.
Case 1: x0 is absorbing and under x0 at least two players quits with positive
probability.
4The new coordinates can be set to any positive number, and not necessarily to 1.
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We will show that in this case x0 is a stationary 0-equilibrium. Since under
x0 at least two players quit with positive probability, the play eventually
terminates even if one player deviates. By Eq. (10), since xλ is a λ-discounted
equilibrium of the auxiliary game Γλ((r
S)∅6=S⊆I , q), and by Eq. (10) once
again, we deduce that for every player i ∈ I we have
γi(x
0) = γ̂i(x
0) = lim
λ→0
γ̂λi (x
λ) ≥ lim
λ→0
γ̂λi (Qi, x
λ
−i) = γ̂i(Qi, x
0
−i) = γi(Qi, x
0
−i)
(11)
and
γi(x
0) = γ̂i(x
0) = lim
λ→0
γ̂λi (x
λ) ≥ lim
λ→0
γ̂λi (Ci, x
λ
−i) = γ̂i(Ci, x
0
−i) = γi(Ci, x
0
−i).
(12)
It follows that no player can profit by deviating in the original quitting game.
Case 2: x0 is absorbing and under x0 there is a single player who quits with
positive probability.
We will prove that for every ε > 0, by supplementing x0 with a threat
strategy against a deviation of the unique player who quits with positive
probability under x0, we can construct a stationary ε-equilibrium.
We argue that xλk = 0 for every abnormal player k and every λ sufficiently
close to 0. Indeed, let k 6∈ I∗ be an abnormal player satisfying xλk > 0 for
every λ sufficiently small. Since xλ is an equilibrium of the λ-discounted
game Γλ((r
S)∅6=S⊆I , q) and by Eq. (10),
lim
λ→0
γ̂λk (Ck, x
λ
−k) ≤ lim
λ→0
γ̂λk (Qk, x
λ
−k) = γ̂k(Qk, x
0
−k) = 0. (13)
Under the strategy profile (Ck, x
0
−k) at most one player quits with positive
probability, hence the quantity limλ→0 γ̂λk (Ck, x
λ
−k) is a convex combination
of qk and (r
j
k)j 6=k. Indeed, in Eq. (9), when substituting x by x
λ and taking
the limit as λ goes to 0, all summands that correspond to sets of players
containing at least two players vanish. Since player k is abnormal, we have
qk = 1, hence there is a player j with r
j
k ≤ 0. This implies that k ∈ I1,
and inductively it implies that k ∈ Il for every l ∈ N, contradicting the
assumption that k is an abnormal player.
Denote by i the unique player who quits with positive probability under
x0. The discussion in the previous paragraph implies that player i is normal.
A possible deviation of player j 6= i is to quit at some stage. As in Eq. (11),
such a deviation is not profitable for player j.
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A possible deviation of player i is to continue forever. In this case his
payoff will be qi rather than 0, so this deviation is possibly profitable. Since i
is a normal player, there is a player j ∈ I∗, distinct from i, such that rji ≤ 0.
It follows that the following strategy profile is a stationary 4ε-equilibrium: at
every stage, player i quits with probability ε, player j quits with probability
ε2, and all other players continue.
Case 3: x0 is nonabsorbing.
Since xλ is a λ-discounted equilibrium and by Eq. (10), we have
lim
λ→0
γ̂λi (x
λ) ≥ lim
λ→0
γ̂λi (Qi, x
λ
−i) = γ̂i(Qi, C−i) = 0. (14)
As in Case 2, if xλi > 0 for every λ sufficiently small, then i is a normal
player. Denote
zλi :=
xλi
λ+
∑
j∈I∗ x
λ
j
, i ∈ I,
and
zλ0 :=
λ
λ+
∑
j∈I∗ x
λ
j
.
Since x0 = ~0 and since xλi = 0 for every λ sufficiently small and every
abnormal player i 6∈ I∗, we have by Eq. (10)
w := lim
λ→0
γ̂λ(xλ) = lim
λ→0
(
zλ0 q +
∑
i∈I∗
zλi r
i
)
.
Set z0 := limλ→0 zλ.
Let ŵ and ẑ be the restriction of w and z0 to the first n coordinates. Note
that ẑ is a probability distribution over {0, 1, · · · , n}. We verify that (ŵ, ẑ)
is a solution of the linear complementarity problem LCP(R̂, q̂), contradicting
the assumption that this problem has no solution. Indeed, by definition
ŵ = ẑ0q +
n∑
i=1
ẑir
i.
Eq. (14) implies that ŵ ∈ Rn≥0. If ẑi > 0 then z0i > 0, and therefore zλi > 0 for
every λ sufficiently close to 0, hence xλi > 0 for every λ sufficiently close to
17
0. This implies that player i is indifferent between continuing and quitting,
so that by Eq. (10),
ŵi = lim
λ→0
γ̂λi (x
λ) = lim
λ→0
γ̂i(Qi, x
λ
−i) = γ̂i(Qi, C−i) = 0.
The claim follows.
3.3 Sunspot Equilibria In Which At Most One Player
Quits At Every Stage
In this section we prove the second statement of Theorem 2.11.
3.3.1 The Set of Possible Sunspot Equilibrium Payoffs
Our goal is to construct a sunspot ε-equilibrium in which only normal players
quit, at every stage at most one player quits, and he does so with a low
probability. This has two consequences. First, the equilibrium payoff will be
in conv(r1, · · · , rn). Second, since rii = 0 for every player i ∈ I, a player who
deviates and quits when he should not, receives an amount close to 0. Hence
the equilibrium payoff will be close to the nonnegative orthant. By Eq. (2) all
abnormal players receive a nonnegative payoff when normal payoffs quit, and
since rii = 0 for every player i ∈ [N ], the abnormal players are content having
only normal players quit. Since such a sunspot ε-equilibrium depends only
on the projection of the vectors (ri)i∈I to normal players, we will consider in
this section the n× n matrix R̂ whose i’th column coincides with the vector
r̂i. The set of all vectors that may be sunspot equilibrium payoff when only
normal players quit, at each stage at most one player quits, and he does so
with small probability, is, then,
D := conv(r̂1, · · · , r̂n) ∩ Rn≥0.
The following observation states that whenever q̂ is in the convex hull
of {r̂1, · · · , r̂n}, then any vector w that is part of a solution of the linear
complementarity problem LCP(R̂, q) lies on the boundary of D.
Lemma 3.1 If q̂ ∈ conv(r̂1, · · · , r̂n) then every solution (w, z) of LCP(R̂, q̂)
satisfies w ∈ ∂D.
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Proof. Fix a solution (w, z) of LCP(R̂, q̂). If the solution (w, z) satisfies
z0 = 1, then w = q̂ and the result holds trivially.
Suppose then that z0 < 1. Since q̂ ∈ conv(r̂1, · · · , r̂n) we have w ∈
conv(r̂1, · · · , r̂n). Since w ∈ Rn≥0 it follows that w ∈ D. Since z0 < 1 there
is a player i ∈ I such that zi > 0, hence by the complementarity condition
wi = 0, and therefore w ∈ ∂D.
3.3.2 The Basic Building Block
As mentioned before, when y ∈ Rn≥0 one solution (w, z) of the problem
LCP(R, y) is the trivial solution in which w = y and z = (1, 0, 0, · · · , 0).
The following theorem asserts that for every y ∈ ∂D a nontrivial solution to
a certain system that is related to problem (3) exists. This theorem is the
basic building block of our construction of a sunspot ε-equilibrium.
Theorem 3.2 Under the assumptions of Theorem 2.11(2), for every y ∈ ∂D
and every ε > 0 there are w ∈ ∂D, w1, · · · , wn ∈ Rn, and z ∈ ∆({0, 1, 2, . . . , n})
that satisfy the following conditions:
(F.1) wi ∈ conv(w, r̂i) \ {w} for every i ∈ [n].
(F.2) wij ≥ −ε for every i, j ∈ [n].
(F.3) w = z0y +
∑n
i=1 ziw
i.
(F.4) If i ∈ [n] and zi > 0, then wii = 0.
(F.5)
∑n
i=1 zi > 0.
Conditions (F.1) and (F.2) state that each wi is in the convex hull of w and
r̂i, and each of its coordinates is at least −ε. Conditions (F.3) and (F.4) state
that (w, z) is a solution of the linear complementarity problem LCP(R, y),
when (wi)ni=1 replace (r̂
i)ni=1, and when the complementarity condition in-
volves the vectors (wi)ni=1 instead of the vector w. Condition (F.5) states
that the solution is not trivial.
We note that the assumptions of Theorem 2.11(2) and Condition (F.1)
imply that the unique solution λi ∈ (0, 1] to the equation wi = λir̂i+(1−λi)w
satisfies λi < 1, provided ε is sufficiently small. Indeed, if λi = 1 then w = r̂
i.
If ε is sufficiently small this implies that r̂i ∈ Rn≥0. But then the linear
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complementarity problem LCP(R̂,~0) has a nontrivial solution with w = r̂i,
a contradiction to the assumptions of Theorem 2.11(2).
N 1
n
w w1
wn
y
rˆ1
w
rˆn
w
z0
z1
zn
λ1
1− λ1
λn
1− λn
Figure 1: A graphic depiction of Theorem 3.2.
Figure 1 provides a graphical interpretation to Theorem 3.2. Nature
chooses an element i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n} according the distribution z. If Nature
chooses 0, the outcome is y. If Nature chooses i ∈ [n], then player i quits
with probability λi. If player i quits, the outcome is r̂
i, and otherwise it is
w.
Condition (F.4) asserts that every player who may be chosen is indifferent
between quitting and continuing, Condition (F.1) asserts that the expected
outcome if player i is chosen is wi. This condition moreover implies that
λi > 0 for every i ∈ [n], so that every player who is chosen, quits with
positive probability. Condition (F.3) asserts that the expected outcome at
the root is w. By Condition (F.5) we have
∑n
i=1 zi > 0, hence some player i
quits with positive probability.
Figure 1 can describe the behavior of the players in a single stage of the
quitting game: Nature’s signal chooses an element of {0, 1, · · · , n} according
to the distribution z. If the choice is 0, no player quits; if the choice is i,
player i quits with probability λi, while all other players continue. We will use
a proper concatenation of this behavior to construct a sunspot ε-equilibrium
in the quitting game Γ((rS)S⊆I).
In the above interpretation, if player i is chosen by nature, he quits with
probability λi. In quitting games players can quit simultaneously, and thus, if
player j quits when player i is chosen, the expected outcome will be λir̂
{i,j}+
(1− λi)r̂j. Since player j’s payoff in this case, λir̂{i,j}j + (1− λi)r̂jj = λir̂{i,j}j ,
may be higher than wij, which is his expected outcome given that player i is
chosen, player j may find it beneficial to quit when player i is chosen. As
in the example in Section 2.5.1, to ensure that this type of deviation is not
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profitable, when player i is chosen, he will not quit in a single stage of the
quitting game, but rather along a block of K stages, where K is sufficiently
large; that is, in each stage of the block, he will quit with probability 1−(1−
λi)
1/K . The expected continuation payoff along the block will thus be in the
convex hull of wi and w. Since w ∈ ∂D ⊂ Rn≥0 and wij ≥ −ε for every j ∈ [n],
this implies that the expected continuation payoff for all players along the
block is at least −ε, so that a player who is supposed to continue throughout
the block cannot profit much by deviating and quitting.
Since w is both an outcome of the tree that appears in Figure 1 and the
expected outcome of this interaction, we can create a repeated version of this
game, in which, if one of the players is chosen and this player does not quit,
then another copy of the game is played, see Figure 2. Since z0+
∑n
i=1 λizi >
0, the length of a play in the tree that appears in Figure 2 is distributed
according to a geometric distribution. We call this auxiliary game G(y).
Note that the possible outcomes of G(y) are r̂1, r̂2, · · · , r̂n, y, and the payoff
under the behavior described above is w.
Denote by w(y) the vector w that corresponds to y ∈ ∂D in Theorem 3.2.
The natural approach to construct a sunspot ε-equilibrium in the original
quitting game would be to find a sequence (yk)k∈N such that yk+1 = w(yk),
and to concatenate the games that appear in Figure 2 one after the other.
This is the approach that we take, though it requires some significant amend-
ments.
w
y
rˆ1
rˆ2
rˆn
w
y
rˆ1
rˆ2
rˆn
w
y
rˆ1
rˆ2
rˆn
w
Figure 2: The auxiliary game G(y) with geometric length.
By Theorem 3.2 we can choose for every y ∈ ∂D a point w(y) ∈ ∂D,
points (wi(y))i∈J(y) ⊂ Rn, and a probability distribution z(y) ∈ ∆({0, 1, · · · , n})
that satisfy Conditions (F.1)–(F.5). As described in Section 3.3.2, these
quantities reflect an ε-equilibrium behavior in an auxiliary quitting game
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with geometric length: w(y) is a sunspot ε-equilibrium payoff in the game
with continuation payoff y. To construct a sunspot ε-equilibrium in the quit-
ting game, we would like to concatenate such ε-equilibria.
If y were a sunspot ε-equilibrium in the game with continuation payoff
w(y), this could be done as follows: we would choose an arbitrary y0 ∈ ∂D
and define inductively yk+1 := w(yk). We would then implement a sunspot
ε-equilibrium in the original game by playing first the ε-equilibrium that
corresponds to the payoff y0 in the auxiliary game with geometric length
G(y1) with continuation payoff y1, then the ε-equilibrium that corresponds
to the payoff y1 in the auxiliary game with geometric length G(y2) with
continuation payoff y2, and so on.
As soon as the total probability of termination under this construction is
1, the resulting strategy profile would be a sunspot ε-equilibrium in the orig-
inal quitting game. There are two problems in implementing this approach.
First, w(y) is a sunspot ε-equilibrium payoff in the auxiliary game with
continuation payoff y, and not vice versa. Hence, if we choose y0 ∈ ∂D
arbitrarily and define inductively yk+1 := w(yk), then time goes backwards:
we should choose some large K ∈ N, play first a sunspot ε-equilibrium with
payoff yK in the auxiliary game with geometric length G(yK−1) with con-
tinuation payoff yK−1, then a sunspot ε-equilibrium with payoff yK−1 in the
auxiliary game with geometric lengthG(yK−2) with continuation payoff yK−2,
and so on, until we play a sunspot ε-equilibrium with payoff y1 in the aux-
iliary game with geometric length G(y0) with continuation payoff y0. After
that we let the player play in an arbitrary way. If the probability that the
game is not terminated by a player before we end playing the sequence of
sunspot ε-equilibria is small, then the way players play after implementing
the sunspot ε-equilibrium in G(y0) does not affect much the payoff, and we
would still obtain a sunspot approximate equilibrium.
The second issue concerns the probability of termination. The probability
that the play in the auxiliary game with geometric length G(yk) with contin-
uation payoff yk terminates by a player under the sunspot ε-equilibrium with
payoff yk+1 is
∑
i∈I∗ zi(y
k). By Condition (F.5) this quantity is positive, but
we do not have a uniform lower bound on it. Hence, we cannot ensure that
the probability of termination by a player under the finite concatenation of
sunspot ε-equilibria in auxiliary games with geometric length can be made
arbitrarily high. To overcome this difficulty we will construct a sequence
(yk)Kk=1 that satisfies the required properties approximately. This approach
is close to Theorem 3 in Simon (2007).
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3.3.3 Proof of Theorem 3.2
To prove Theorem 3.2 we need two notations. For every nonempty set J ⊆ I
of indices define
S(J) := conv{r̂i, i ∈ J}.
For every y ∈ Rn denote
Jy := {i ∈ [n] : yi = 0}.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is divided into three cases. Let y ∈ ∂D.
• The case y ∈ S(Jy) holds trivially, since we can take wi = (1−ε)y+εr̂i
for each i ∈ [n], w = y, and (z0, z1, · · · , zn) is a probability distribution
that satisfies that y =
∑
i∈Jy zir̂
i.
• The case y 6∈ S(Jy) and conv(S(Jy), y) ∩ D = {y} is handled in
Lemma 3.3.
• The case y 6∈ S(Jy) and conv(S(Jy), y) ∩ D % {y} is handled in
Lemma 3.4.
Lemma 3.3 Let y ∈ ∂D such that y 6∈ S(Jy). If conv(S(Jy), y) ∩D = {y}
then the conclusion of Theorem 3.2 holds.
D
SJy
yyε
Figure 3, Part A: The construction in Lemma 3.3.
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Figure 3, Part B: The construction in Lemma 3.3.
Proof. For every ε > 0 let yε ∈ conv(S(Jy), y) \ {y} satisfy d(yε, y) ≤ ε
(see Figure 3(A)). Since y ∈ D ⊆ conv(r̂1, · · · , r̂n), it follows that yε ∈
conv(r̂1, · · · , r̂n). Since conv(S(Jy), y)∩D = {y} we have yε 6∈ D = conv(r̂1, · · · , r̂n)∩
Rn≥0, and therefore yε 6∈ Rn≥0.
Let (wε, zε) ∈ Rn≥0 ×∆({0, 1, · · · , n}) be a solution of the linear comple-
mentarity problem LCP(R, yε), so that wε,i = 0 or zε,i = 0 for every i ∈ [n],
and
wε = zε,0yε +
∑
i∈I∗
zε,ir̂
i.
By Lemma 3.1, wε ∈ ∂D. In particular, wε ∈ conv(S(Jwε), yε) ∩ D. By
taking a subsequence we can assume that the limits
w := lim
ε→0
wε, z := lim
ε→0
zε, y := lim
ε→0
yε
exist. We can moreover assume that the sets (J(wε))ε>0 are independent
of ε. Since wε ∈ ∂D for every ε > 0 it follows that w ∈ ∂D. Note that
w = z0y +
∑
i∈I∗ zir̂
i. Furthermore, for every i ∈ [n] we have wi = 0 or
zi = 0. We argue that w 6= y.
Indeed, assume by contradiction that y = w = limε→0wε. It follows that
Jwε ⊆ Jy for every ε > 0 sufficiently small. In particular, S(Jwε) ⊆ S(Jy)
for every ε > 0 sufficiently small. Since conv(S(Jy), y) ∩D = {y} and since
yε ∈ conv(S(Jy), y) \ {y}, we conclude that conv(S(Jwε), yε) ∩ D = ∅. But
wε ∈ conv(S(Jwε), yε) ∩D, a contradiction.
Define
ẑ0 :=
εz0
εz0 +
∑n
i=1 zi
, ẑi :=
zi
εz0 +
∑n
i=1 zi
, ∀i ∈ [n].
Note that zi > 0 if and only if ẑi > 0. Therefore wi = 0 or ẑi = 0 for every
i ∈ [n]. Define for every i ∈ Jw,
wi := (1− ε)w + εr̂i, (15)
see Figure 3(B).
We argue that the conclusion of Theorem 3.2 holds for w, (wi)i∈[n], and
(ẑi)i∈[n]. By construction Conditions (F.1) and (F.2) hold. If ẑi > 0 then
zi > 0, hence wi = 0, which implies that w
i
i = 0, so that Condition (F.4)
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holds as well. Since w = z0y +
∑
i∈I∗ zir
i, and since w 6= y, it follows that∑
i∈[n] zi > 0, and therefore
∑
i∈[n] ẑi > 0, implying that Condition (F.5)
holds. We now verify that Condition (F.3) holds as well. By Condition (F.2)
and Eq. (15),
εw = εz0y +
∑
i∈I∗
εzir̂
i = εz0y +
∑
i∈I∗
zi(w
i − (1− ε)w).
This implies that
w =
εz0y +
∑
i∈I∗ ziw
i
εz0 +
∑
i∈I∗ zi
= ẑ0y +
∑
i∈I∗
ẑiw
i,
and Condition (F.3) holds as well.
Lemma 3.4 Let y ∈ ∂D such that y 6∈ S(Jy). If conv(S(Jy), y) ∩D % {y}
then the conclusion of Theorem 3.2 holds.
D
y
r̂i
w
Figure 4, Part A: The construction in Lemma 3.4.
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Figure 4, Part B: The construction in Lemma 3.4.
Proof. Fix ε > 0 sufficiently small. Assume first that there is i ∈ Jy
such that conv(r̂i, y)∩D % {y}, see Figure 5(A). Since ri 6∈ D while y ∈ ∂D
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and conv(r̂i, y) ∩D % {y}, it follows that there is w ∈ conv(r̂i, y) ∩ ∂D. In
particular, there is λ ∈ (0, 1) such that w = λr̂i + (1− λ)y. Since i ∈ J(y) it
follows that wi = 0. Thus, Theorem 3.2 holds with w
i = (1 − ε)w + εr̂i for
every i ∈ I∗, and z that is defined by
z0 :=
ε(1− λ)
ε(1− λ) + λ, zi :=
λ
ε(1− λ) + λ.
Indeed, since w = λri + (1− λ)y we have
εw = ελr̂i + ε(1− λ)y = λ(wi = (1− ε)w) + ε(1− λ)y,
so that
w =
ε(1− λ)
ε(1− λ) + λy +
λ
ε(1− λ) + λr̂
i.
Assume now that conv(r̂i, y)∩D = {y} for every i ∈ Jy and consider the
set (see Figure 5(B))
Ŝε := (1− δ)y + δS(Jy).
Since conv(r̂i, y) ∩ D = {y}, the set Ŝε is not a subset of D. Moreover,
provided ε is sufficiently small, this set intersects D. In particular, there is
a point w ∈ ∂D ∩ Ŝε. Since δ > 0, we have w 6= y.
For every player i ∈ J(y) define
wi := (1− ε)y + εri.
The points (wi)i∈J(y) are the extreme points of the set Ŝε, and therefore there
is a probability distribution z ∈ ∆(Jy) such that w =
∑
i∈I∗ ziw
i. The reader
can verify that the conclusion of Theorem 3.2 holds with w, (wi)i∈Jy , and z.
3.3.4 An Approximation Result
We start by a technical observation that will serve as an approximation tool.
Theorem 3.5 Let (X, d) be a complete metric space and let f : X → X be
a function that does not have any fixed point. For every c, C ∈ R≥0 there
are K ∈ N and a sequence (xk)Kk=1 of points in X such that the following
properties hold:
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(A.1)
∑K
k=1 d(x
k, f(xk)) > C.
(A.2)
∑K−1
k=1 d(x
k+1, f(xk)) < c.
Figure 5 provides a graphical depiction of Theorem 3.5; each solid line
represents the distance between some xk and f(xk), and each dashed line
represents the distance between some f(xk) and xk+1. The theorem claims
that the total length of the solid lines is above C, while the total length of
the dashed lines is less than c.
x1 x2 x3 xK−1 xK
f(x1) f(x2) f(xK−1) f(xK)
Figure 5: The construction in Theorem 3.5.
Proof. The proof uses a transfinite construction. We define an ordinal
α∗ and a sequence (xα)α<α∗ as follows:
(TI.1) x0 ∈ X is arbitrary.
(TI.2) If α is a successor ordinal set xα := f(xα−1).
(TI.3) If α is a limit ordinal and
∑
β<α d(x
β, f(xβ)) = ∞, set α∗ := α and
terminate the definition of the sequence.
(TI.4) If α is a limit ordinal and
∑
β<α d(x
β, f(xβ)) <∞, set xα := limβ<α xβ.
We note that if α is a limit ordinal and
∑
β<α d(x
β, f(xβ)) < ∞ then for
every ε > 0 there is an ordinal αε < α for which
∑
αε≤β<α d(x
β, f(xβ)) < ε,
which implies the existence of the limit limβ<α x
β. Since the space X is
complete, the limit limβ<α x
β in Case (TI.4) is in X, hence the definition of
the sequence (xα)α<α∗ is valid.
Since f has no fixed point, d(x, f(x)) > 0 for every x ∈ X, and therefore
the construction ends at some ordinal α∗. In fact, since the set of rational
numbers is dense in the set of real numbers, the ordinal α∗ is a countable
ordinal. Since
∑
β<α∗ d(x
β, f(xβ)) = ∞, there is an ordinal α1 such that∑
β<α1
d(xβ, f(xβ)) > C + 1 By definition,∑
α<α∗
d(xα, f(xα)) = sup
A
∑
α∈A
d(xα, f(xα)),
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where A ranges over all finite sets of ordinals smaller than α∗, hence there is a
finite set A of ordinals smaller than α1 such that the following two conditions
hold:
(A.1’)
∑
α∈A d(x
α, f(xα)) > C.
(A.2’)
∑
α 6∈A,α<α1 d(x
α, f(xα)) < c.
Denote K := |A| and A = {u1, u2, · · · , uK}, and assume that u1 < u2 <
· · · < uK . By Condition (A.1’),
K∑
k=1
d(xu
k
, f(xu
k
)) =
∑
α∈A
d(xα, f(xα)) > C.
By the triangle inequality and Condition (A.2’),
K∑
k=1
d(xu
k
, f(xu
k+1
)) ≤
∑
uk≤α<uk+1
d(f(xα), xα+1)
≤
∑
α 6∈A,α<α1
d(xα, f(xα)) < c.
The result follows.
3.3.5 Constructing a Strategy Profile ξ∗
Fix ε > 0 sufficiently small so that each of the vectors r̂i contains an entry
that is smaller than −ε. We now define a strategy profile ξ∗ in the quitting
game, which will turn out to be a sunspot 10ε-equilibrium.
We note that under the assumptions of Theorem 2.11, the function w :
∂D → ∂D does not have a fixed point. Indeed, the existence of such a
fixed point implies that the linear complementarity problem LCP(R̂,~0) has
a nontrivial solution.
By Theorem 3.5 applied to C =
(n2)·2(1+ε)
ε2
, c = ε, X = ∂D endowed with
the supremum norm, and f(y) = w(y) for every y ∈ ∂D, there are K ∈ N
and a sequence (yk)Kk=1 that satisfy
(A.1”)
∑K
k=1 ‖yk − w(yk)‖∞ > (
n
2)·2(1+ε)
ε2
.
(A.2”)
∑K−1
k=1 ‖yk+1 − w(yk)‖∞ < ε.
28
For every k ∈ [K] let Ck ∈ N be sufficiently large such that
1− (1− λi(yk))1/Ck < ε, ∀i ∈ I∗.
We argue that λi(y
k) < 1, hence such Ck exists. Indeed, if λi(y
k) = 1 then
necessarily r̂i ∈ Rn≥0, which implies that the linear complementarity problem
LCP(R̂,~0) has a nontrivial solution, contradicting the assumptions.
The strategy profile ξ∗ that we will construct will yield a payoff close to
w(yK). We will partition the set of stages N into K+ 1 kiloblocks of random
(possibly infinite) size. For each k ∈ [K], kiloblock k will mimic the sunspot
ε-equilibrium in the auxiliary game with geometric length G(yK−k+1) with
continuation payoff yK−k+1 that yields equilibrium payoff w(yK−k+1). The
last kiloblock will represent the rest of the game. Condition (A.1”) will imply
that under ξ∗ with high probability the play terminates in one of the first
K kiloblocks. Condition (A.2”) will imply that the fact that the equilibrium
payoff of the play in the k’th kiloblock, namely, w(yK−k+1), differs from the
continuation payoff in the auxiliary game G(yK−k), does not affect much the
payoffs of the players.
Partition the set of stages N into K + 1 kiloblocks of random (possibly
infinite) size as follows. For k ∈ [K], the kiloblock is divided into blocks of
size Ck; each block has a type from the set {0, 1, · · · , n}. At the beginning
of the kiloblock, as well as at the end of each block, the type of the coming
block is chosen by nature.
• With probability zi the type of the next block is i.
• With probability z0 the type of the next block is 0, this block is the
last block of the kiloblock, and the next kiloblock starts once this block
ends.
The last kiloblock, which is the (K + 1)’th kiloblock, is not divided into
blocks and contains all remaining stages.
Define a strategy profile ξ∗ as follows. At stage t,
• If t lies in a block of type i ∈ [n] is kiloblock k ∈ [K], then at stage
t player i quits with probability 1 − (1 − λi(yK−k+1))1/CK−k+1 , and all
other players continue.
• If t lies in the last block of a kiloblock (and then its type is necessarily
0), or in the (K + 1)’th kiloblock, then all players continue at stage t.
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3.4 The Strategy Profile ξ∗ is a Sunspot 7ε-equilibrium.
In this section we prove that the strategy profile ξ∗ is a sunspot 7ε-equilibrium.
We will use the following inequality, which holds since, by Condition (F.3),
w − y = ∑ni=1 zi(wi − y):
‖w − y‖∞ ≤ 2
n∑
i=1
zi. (16)
We first prove that the expected payoff of the normal players under the
strategy profile ξ∗ is close to w(yK).
Lemma 3.6 For every normal player i ∈ I∗ we have |γi(ξ∗)−wi(yK)| < 2ε.
Proof. Fix a normal player i ∈ I∗. Define a stochastic process ηi =
(ηki )
K+1
k=1 as follows:
• If the play was terminated before kiloblock k by the set of players S∗,
set
ηki := r̂
S∗
i +
∑
l<k
‖yK−l+1i − wi(yK−l)‖∞, (17)
where S∗ is the set of players who quit at stage t∗.
• If the play was not terminated before kiloblock k, set
ηki := wi(y
K−k+1) +
∑
l<k
‖yK−l+1i − wi(yK−l)‖∞. (18)
By Eq. (16) and Condition (A.1”) we have
∑K
k=1 zi(y
k) ≥ 1
ε
, hence under
the strategy profile ξ∗ the play terminates during the first K kiloblocks with
probability at least 1− ε. By Condition (F.3), the process ηi is a submartin-
gale under the strategy profile ξ∗, hence
wi(y
K) = η1i ≤ Eξ∗ [ηK+1i ] ≤ γi(ξ∗) + 2ε,
where the last inequality holds by the choice of c, Condition (A.2”), and since
with high probability the play terminates during the first K kiloblocks.
Similarly, if one replaces the plus sign in Eqs. (17) and (18) with a minus
sign, the process ηi becomes a supermartingale under the strategy profile ξ
∗,
hence
wi(y
K) = η1i ≥ Eξ∗ [ηK+1i ] ≥ γi(ξ∗)− 2ε,
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and the claim follows.
The next lemma, which relies on the definition of C, states that even if
some normal player i ∈ I∗ deviates and continues forever, the play terminates
with high probability before the end of the K’th kiloblock.
Lemma 3.7 If r̂i 6∈ Rn≥0 for every i ∈ I∗, then for every player j ∈ I∗ we
have
P(Cj ,ξ∗−j)(t∗ is smaller than the stage in which kiloblock K+1 starts) ≥ 1−ε.
Proof. Set L :=
(n2)
ε
. By the choice of C and Condition (A.1”), there are
1 = k1 < k2 < · · · < kL < kL+1 = K such that
kl+1∑
k=kl
d(yk, w(yk)) > 2
ε
, ∀l ∈ [L]. (19)
Call the collection of kiloblocks {k : kl ≤ k < kl+1} the l’th megablock.
Eqs. (16) and (19) implies that under the strategy profile ξ∗ the probability
that the play terminates during each megablock is at least 1 − ε. We claim
that there are at least two normal players who, under strategy profile ξ∗,
quit during each megablock with probability at least ε. Indeed, consider the
l’th megablock and assume by way of contradiction that there is a unique
player i ∈ I∗ who quits with probability larger than ε during this megablock.
Then ‖w(yK−kl+1) − r̂i‖∞ ≤ nε. However, w(yK−kl+1) ∈ ∂D ⊆ Rn≥0, while
r̂i 6∈ Rn≥0, a contradiction when ε is sufficiently small.
Since there are
(
n
2
)
pairs of players, the choice of L implies that there is a
pair of players who quit with probability at least ε in at least 1
ε
megablocks.
The result follows.
The next result complete the proof that ξ∗ is a sunspot 7ε-equilibrium.
Lemma 3.8 For every player i ∈ I and every pure strategy ξi ∈ Xi we have
γi(ξi, ξ
∗
−i) ≤ wi(yK) + 5ε.
Proof. Consider first a normal player i ∈ I∗. We define a stochastic
process ηi = (η
t
i)t∈N, which approximates the expected continuation payoff
of player i from stage t and on. Unlike in the proof of Lemma 3.6, where
the process was defined for kiloblocks, here it is defined for stages. For each
stage t that lies in kiloblock k:
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• If the play was terminated at some stage t∗ < t, set
ηti := r̂
S∗
i −
∑
l<k
‖yK−l+1 − w(yK−l)‖∞,
where S∗ is the set of players who quit at stage t∗.
• If t lies in a block of type 0 in the k’th kiloblock, we set
ηti := y
K−k+1
i −
∑
l<k
‖yK−l+1 − w(yK−l)‖∞.
• If k is the first stage of a block of type i in the k’th kiloblock, we set
ηti := wi(y
K−k+1)−
∑
l<k
‖yK−l+1 − w(yK−l)‖∞.
• If k is the l’th stage of a block of type i in the k’th kiloblock, we set
ηti := δwi(y
K−k+1) + (1− δ)r̂ii −
∑
l<k
‖yK−l+1 − w(yK−l)‖∞,
where δ = (1− λi(yK−k+1))(CK−k+1−l+1)/CK−k+1 .
By Conditions (F.3) and (A.2”), the process (ηti)t∈N is a supermartingale
under the strategy profile ξ∗. Whenever player i quits under ξ∗i with positive
probability, he is indifferent between quitting and continuing. Hence, the
process ηi is a supermartingale under the strategy profile (Ci, ξ
∗
−i) as well.
Whenever a player other than player i quits with positive probability, he does
so with probability smaller than ε. By Assumption 2.1 and since yk ∈ ∂D ⊂
Rn≥0 for every k ∈ [K], it follows that for every strategy ξi of player i,
wi(y
K) = η1i ≥ E(ξi,ξ∗−i)[ηK+1i ] ≥ γ(ξi, ξ∗−i)− 5ε.
Consider now an abnormal player i 6∈ I∗. Under the strategy profile ξ∗,
whenever a normal player quits, he does so with probability smaller than ε.
Consequently, if player i quits at some stage, his expected terminal payoff is
bounded by ε. Let ηti be the expected payoff of player i from stage t and on,
assuming that if the game is not terminated by the end of the K’th kiloblock,
the continuation payoff is 0. The process (ηti)t∈N is a martingale that attains
nonnegative values before the play terminates at stage t∗. Condition (A.1”)
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and Eq. (16) imply that the probability that the game is not terminated by
the end of the K’th kiloblock is smaller than ε, hence as above
wi(y
K) = η1i ≥ E(ξi,ξ∗−i)[ηK+1i ] ≥ γ(ξi, ξ∗−i)− 2ε,
and the desired result follows.
4 Characterizing the Set of Sunspot Equilib-
rium Payoffs
A vector x ∈ RN is a sunspot equilibrium payoff if it is the limit of payoffs that
correspond to sunspot ε-equilibria, as ε goes to 0. Theorem 2.11 proves that
if the matrix R̂ is a Q-matrix then there is a sunspot equilibrium payoff in the
set D. A complete characterization of the set of sunspot equilibrium payoffs
seems to be at present out of reach, yet it may be possible to characterize
the set of sunspot equilibrium payoffs that can be generated by quittings of
single players. In this section we identify one case in which the set of these
sunspot equilibrium payoffs can be characterized.
In the literature of linear complementarity problems, a Q-matrix is called
an M-matrix if its diagonal entries are positive and all other entries are
nonpositive, see Murty (1988). Since we require that rii = 0 for every i ∈ I,
we say that a Q-matrix is an M-matrix if in every row and every column of
the matrix there is exactly one positive entry.
Theorem 4.1 If the matrix R̂ is an M-matrix, then any payoff vector in D˜
is a sunspot equilibrium payoff, where D˜ := conv{r1, · · · , rn} ∩ RN≥0.
Proof. It is well known that any M -matrix R̂ is inverse positive, that
is, its inverse R̂−1 is a nonnegative matrix (see, e.g., Fujimoto and Ranade,
2004). Fix i ∈ [n]. Since R̂−1 is a nonnegative matrix, R̂−1ei ∈ Rn≥0, where
ei = (0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0) is the i’th unit vector in Rn. Therefore we can
write
R̂−1ei =
n∑
j=1
λije
j, (20)
where (λij)
n
j=1 are nonnegative numbers, not all of them zero. Set
λ̂ij :=
λij∑n
j=1 λ
i
j
.
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Multiplying both sides of Eq. (20) from the left by R̂ we get
ei =
n∑
j=1
λijR̂e
j =
n∑
j=1
λij r̂
j,
so that wi := 1‖λi‖1 e
i ∈ D, for each i ∈ [n]. Both convex hulls conv(w1, · · · , wn)
and conv(r̂1, · · · , r̂n) are (n−1)-dimensional sets such that conv(w1, · · · , wn) ⊆
conv(r̂1, · · · , r̂n). Since in every row of R̂ there is a single positive entry, it
follows that D = conv(w1, · · · , wn): every element of D can be presented as
a weighted average of w1, · · · , wn.
Since R̂ is an M -matrix, there is a unique index ji ∈ [n] such that r̂jii > 0.
Since wi is a convex combination of r̂1, · · · , r̂n, since wii > 0, and since the
unique index k such that r̂ki > 0 is k = ji, it follows that λ
i
ji
> 0. Since for
all coordinates k 6= i we have r̂jik ≤ 0, for αi > 0 sufficiently small we have
wi − αir̂ji ∈ Rn≥0, which implies that y[i] := w
i−αir̂ji
1−αi ∈ conv(w1, · · · , wn).
Consequently wi = αir̂
ji + (1− αi)y[i] and there is a probability distribution
βi = (βij)j∈[n] such that y
[i] =
∑n
j=1 β
i
jw
j.
The reader can verify that for every i ∈ I∗, the vectors (y[i])i∈[n], (wj)j∈[n],
and (βij)i,j∈[n] satisfy the following conditions, which are analogous to Con-
ditions (F.1)–(F.5):
(F.1’) wi ∈ conv(y[i], r̂i) \ {y[i]} for every i ∈ [n].
(F.2’) wij ≥ 0 for every i, j ∈ [n].
(F.3’) y[i] =
∑n
j=1 β
i
jw
i, for every i ∈ [n].
(F.4’) If i ∈ [n] and βij > 0, then wii = 0.
This implies that we can repeat the construction in Section 3.3, yet now the
sequence (yα)α<α∗ has a finite range, namely (y
[i])i∈[n]: to implement y[i] as
a sunspot equilibrium payoff, nature chooses j ∈ I∗ according to the proba-
bility distribution (βij)j∈[n] and the players implement w
j. To implement wj,
player j quits along a sufficiently long block with a total probability of λj,
where λj satisfies w
i = λj r̂
j + (1−λj)y[j], and, if he did not quit, the players
implement the vector y[j].
We note that in this case the ordinal α∗ is the first countable ordinal
ω. Since D = conv(w1, · · · , wn), by adding an initial stage in which nature
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chooses which of the vectors (wi)i∈[n] the players implement as a sunspot
ε-equilibrium payoff, we can implement every vector in D˜ as a the payoff of
a sunspot ε-equilibrium.
One distinction between the construction presented in this section and the
construction in the general case is that while in the general case the sequence
(yα)α<α∗ was a deterministic sequence, here this sequence is a stochastic
process, that depends on nature’s choices.
5 Discussion and Open Problems
Quitting games are stopping games in which the payoff processes are con-
stant that are independent of time. Shmaya and Solan (2004) developed
a technique that allows reducing the question of existence of ε-equilibrium
in stopping games with integrable payoff processes to the question of exis-
tence of ε-equilibrium in quitting games or absorbing games. Heller (2012)
and Mashiah-Yaakovi (2014) used the approach of Shmaya and Solan (2004)
to prove the existence of normal-form correlated ε-equilibrium in multiplayer
stopping games and of subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in multiplayer stopping
games with perfect information, respectively. This approach can be used to-
gether with our result to show that every multiplayer stopping game admits
a sunspot ε-equilibrium. The proof is analogous to the proofs in Shmaya and
Solan (2004), Heller (2012), and Mashiah-Yaakovi (2014).
Quitting games are also a subclass of absorbing games, which are repeated
games in which player may have more than two actions and there are several
nonabsorbing entries (see Vrieze and Thuijsman, 1989). Absorbing games
are a subclass of stochastic games. The next step in the research is to extend
our result to absorbing games, and then to stochastic games.
To construct a sunspot ε-equilibrium from the existence of a solution to
the auxiliary game with geometric length we used a transfinite construction,
because we could not prove that the per-stage probability that some player
quits in the auxiliary game is uniformly bounded away from 0. If the existence
of a positive lower bound could be proven, then the construction of a sunspot
ε-equilibrium would simplify.
One way to evade the need of a transfinite induction is to show that
there is y0 ∈ ∂D for which the sequence (yα)α<α∗ contains finitely many
distinct values. This is what happens when the matrix R̂ is an M -matrix,
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where the process (yα)α<α∗ contains n distinct values. Another case where
this phenomenon occurs is when each of the vectors r̂i contains exactly one
negative coordinate. In this case one can show that by properly choosing y0,
the sequence (yα)α<α∗ contains two distinct values. We could not identify an
example where the use of a sequence (yα)α<α∗ with infinitely many distinct
values is necessary.
When the matrix R̂ is an M -matrix, the set of sunspot equilibrium payoffs
that can be generated by single quittings coincides with the set D˜. We do
not know whether this coincidence holds for other classes of Q-matrices, or
whether we can provide a different characterization to the set of sunspot
equilibrium payoffs that can be generated by our construction, when the
matrix R̂ is a Q-matrix that is not an M -matrix.
In our construction, the expected payoff of a player after some history
may be negative, albeit at least −ε, see Condition (F.2) in Theorem 3.2.
It would be interesting to know whether one can ensure that the expected
payoff of all players after every history is nonnegative.
Our study also raises questions about Q-matrices, a topic that was not
extensively studied in the last decades. In the characterization of the set of
sunspot equilibrium payoffs in Section 4 we used the fact that M -matrices
are inverse positive. Unfortunately, the inverse of a Q-matrix whose diagonal
entries are 0 need not be a nonnegative matrix. One such example is the
(3 × 3)-matrix whose off-diagonal entries are equal to 1. In our application
the matrix R̂ satisfies additional properties, for example, each row and each
column contains at least one negative entry. Is it true that every Q-matrix
whose diagonal entries are 0 and such that in each row and each column there
is a negative entry is inverse positive? If not, can one characterize the set of
inverse-positive Q-matrices that satisfy these conditions? Suppose that the
matrix R̂ is inverse positive; can one characterize the set of sunspot equilibria
payoffs?
One last question that we will mention concerns the columns of the matrix
R̂. Suppose that there is a normal player i such that rij < 0 for every j 6= i.
Thus, all players prefer to quit alone rather than having player i quit. Is the
matrix R̂ a Q-matrix? If not, then it follows that when R̂ is a Q-matrix, and
provided the game admits no stationary ε-equilibrium, every column of the
matrix R̂ contains at least one positive entry. This property, if true, may
help in future study of quitting games.
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